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Abstract 
Despite increased research efforts in the area of reconciliation and trust repair in 
economic relations, most studies depart from a victim’s perspective and evaluate the process of 
trust repair by looking at the impact of restoration tactics on victims’ reactions. We focused on 
the transgressor’s perspective and present findings from two studies that investigated how the 
amount of compensation that a transgressor is willing to pay depends on victims’ reactions to the 
transgression (i.e. whether they claim the transgression happened intentionally or 
unintentionally) and the time horizon of the relationship between the transgressor and the victim 
(future vs. no future interaction). We hypothesized and found that transgressors are willing to 
pay less compensation to a victim who believes the transgression happened intentionally (as 
opposed to unintentionally), but only so when they share no future interaction perspective 
together.  When transgressors have a future interaction perspective with the victim, intentionality 
feedback does not affect compensation size. 
Keywords: compensation; intentionality; perpetrators; transgression; reconciliation; trust repair;  
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How Many Pennies for Your Pain? Willingness to Compensate as a Function of Expected Future 
Interaction and Intentionality Feedback 
Trust is a vital facilitator of cooperation in almost any kind of social interaction we 
engage in. None of these interactions, however, being it in short- or long-term relations, are 
immune to negative incidents that can damage trust. In economic relationships too, the 
importance of trust in creating and preserving cooperative relations contrasts sharply with the 
prevalence of conflict and trust violations. Transgressions in these relations may not just erode 
trust and put that particular relation in danger, but may also affect one’s trust in other current and 
future relationships. Therefore, an important challenge lies in understanding how reconciliation 
can be fostered and trust can be restored between agents in economic-based relationships. 
As most of the literature on trust so far has focused on the process of building and 
maintaining trust, only little research has been conducted on the topic of reconciliation and trust 
repair (e.g. Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009). Over the last years, scholarly interest in the process of 
trust repair has increased and as a first step, studies have investigated how and when particular 
restorative tactics can be effective.  For example, research has revealed how and when verbal 
accounts, such as apologies, denials or justifications, can be an effective tool to restore trust (De 
Cremer, Pillutla & Reinders Folmer, 2011; De Cremer & Schouten, 2008; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, 
& Dirks, 2004; Leunissen, De Cremer, Reinders Folmer, & Van Dijke, 2013; Schlenker, Pontari, 
& Christopher, 2001). In economic exchange relations, where economic resources are the object 
of interaction and a transgression often results in a tangible, economic loss, the provision of a 
financial compensation can too exert a positive influence on the restoration of trust and the 
preservation of a cooperative relation (De Cremer, 2010; Desmet, De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2010; 
2011a, b; Bottom, Daniels, Gibson & Murnighan, 2002; Gibson, Bottom & Murnighan, 1999). 
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Given that transgressions in these relations often entail a financial loss, research has shown that 
the mere provision of verbal accounts like apologies could be regarded as cheap talk and the 
provision of compensation is therefore more apt in fostering reconciliation and renewed 
cooperation. 
Although increased research efforts in the area of trust repair in economic relationships 
have illuminated when and how particular restoration strategies can be effective, most studies 
conducted so far all have in common that they tend to depart from a victim’s perspective. These 
studies have focused on the possibility of trust repair by examining the impact of for instance 
apologies or financial compensations on victims’ trust intentions and behaviors. This is a logical 
starting point for investigating the feasibility of reconciliation in economic relations, but now 
that we have substantial evidence that particular restoration strategies like financial 
compensations can be effective to restore trust and cooperation in economic relations, an 
important next step is to see whether and to what extent transgressors are actually willing to 
provide them. Transgressors play a crucial role in deciding whether and to which extent they 
wish to financially compensate the victim of an economic transgression. We therefore argue that 
for a full understanding of the determinants of reconciliation and trust repair in economic 
relationships, it is not only valuable to know the circumstances under which different financial 
compensations are most effective in restoring trust, but it is equally imperative to investigate the 
circumstances under which transgressors decide whether to compensate and how much 
compensation they are willing to provide. 
Research on the willingness to compensate is very scarce to date. In fact, we are only 
aware of two such studies, conducted in the 1960’s (Berscheid & Walster, 1967; Berscheid, 
Walster, & Barclay, 1969). These studies looked at whether or not transgressors were willing to 
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compensate depending on whether their options to compensate were restricted to only provide 
partial compensation, only exact compensation or only overcompensation. The researchers found 
that perpetrators were more likely to compensate when exact equity could be restored, compared 
to when exact equity could not be restored (i.e. either under- or overcompensation). No research, 
however, has considered how much transgressors are actually willing to give in the more realistic 
situation in which they have no such restrictions. In response to the shortage of this research, we 
present findings from two studies in which we investigated how the victim’s reaction to the 
transgression (i.e. whether they claimed the transgression happened intentionally or 
unintentionally) influences the amount of compensation that a transgressor is willing to provide.  
In this venture, we take an instrumental perspective on transgressors’ restoration strategies and 
hypothesize that whether transgressors take this feedback from victims into account when 
deciding to compensate, will depend on whether there is a future interaction perspective with the 
victim or not.  
1. Transgressors and victim feedback 
Following a transgression, transgressors are often motivated to engage in reconciliatory 
behavior (Shnabel & Nalder, 2008). It should however also be stressed that perpetrators tend to 
be strategic in their decision to undertake restorative action. Arguing that apologizing comes at a 
high social cost and does not guarantee forgiveness from the victim, Leunissen, De Cremer and 
Reinders Folmer (2012), for example, hypothesized and found in an economic setting that 
transgressors are less likely to apologize if they have information that indicates that victims will 
most likely be unforgiving. Indeed, the authors found that if a victim shows that he/she is willing 
to forgive, transgressors are more likely to apologize compared to an unforgiving victim. Their 
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findings therefore suggest that transgressors will be more inclined to take efforts to repair a 
relationship when it is likely that these efforts lead to forgiveness.  
One of the pieces of information that may signal whether or not a victim will be inclined 
to forgive, is whether the victim believes the transgressor committed the transgression 
intentionally or not. Prior research has repeatedly shown that one of the fundamental attributions 
that victims seek to make when treated unfairly concerns an attribution about intent (Greenberg, 
1990; McCabe, Rigdon, & Smith, 2003; Rutte & Messick, 1995). Moreover, perceptions of 
intent influence attributions of culpability and blameworthiness for transgressions, and people’s 
tendency to respond to them with forgiveness or retribution (Aquino, Tripp & Bies, 2001; Darley 
& Pittman, 2003; Fincham, 2000; Leunissen et al., 2013). 
Trust repair research has revealed that whether or not victims believe a transgression was 
performed intentionally is a crucial determinant of the effectiveness of subsequent restoration 
strategies. Struthers and colleagues (2008) for example found that whereas for unintentional 
transgressions apologies may help in stimulating victim forgiveness they become less effective 
when victims attributed intent to the violation. Interestingly, and important to our present 
research question, in the context of economic exchanges, findings have indicated that the 
effectiveness of financial compensations on the victim’s responses too depends on the extent to 
which victims see the transgression as intentional or not (Desmet et al., 2011a).  
An interesting question that then arises is whether transgressors will also adapt their 
compensation strategy (i.e. the level of financial compensation they are willing to pay) 
depending on how victims think about the intentionality underlying the violation. We are not 
aware of any research that has investigated the effects of allegations of intentionality on a 
perpetrators willingness to compensate. Nevertheless, this is arguably an important variable to 
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study, as this kind of information is likely to be communicated by a victim in the wake of a 
transgression. How may this intentionality feedback influence the willingness of a perpetrator to 
financially compensate a victim?  
When a transgressor learns that a victim believes that the transgression was committed 
intentionally, this may suggest to the transgressor that the damage to the relation is much more 
severe than when the victim believes the transgression was committed unintentionally. 
Furthermore, it may suggest that the victim does not have a strong motivation to forgive. The 
important question then becomes whether the transgressor is willing to engage in these costly 
reconciliation efforts, when the risk of not being forgiven is relatively high and the cost of the 
restorative action is equally high. Indeed, financial compensation literally comes at a substantial 
cost to the transgressor. Given that the likelihood to be forgiven is much lower when a victim 
believes the transgression was intentional, an instrumental perspective on the willingness of 
transgressors to pay financial compensation would suggest that when a victim believes the 
violation occurred intentionally, perpetrators would be less inclined to compensate as the cost of 
financial compensation may be too high concerning the relatively low likelihood of being 
forgiven (i.e. the benefits). When the victim believes the violation occurred unintentionally, 
perpetrators may perceive the likelihood of a financial compensation obtaining its desired effect 
as higher, and are as such more willing to financially compensate the victim, compared to when 
the victim thinks the transgression occurred intentionally. 
2. When refusing to compensate is not an option: A future interaction perspective 
The reasoning above suggests that instrumental transgressors will be less inclined to offer 
a financial compensation when victims hold bad beliefs regarding the transgressor’s intent to 
commit the transgression. We propose that under some circumstances, transgressors will still be 
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motivated to pay financial compensation to victims, even when these victims displayed their 
belief of bad intent on behalf of the perpetrator. We argue that this will be a function of the 
structure of the relationship with the victim (i.e. whether transgressor and victim are engaged in a 
short-term or long-term relationship).  
When people are in an exchange relationship with a long-term interaction perspective, 
their behavior towards their interaction partner can be fundamentally different from when the 
relationship has a short-term perspective. Experimental findings with economic games have 
consistently shown that when people expect ongoing interaction, they behave more cooperatively 
than when they do not (Mannix, 1994; Murnighan & Roth, 1983; Shapiro, 1975). Murnighan and 
Roth (1984) for example explicitly manipulated the expected probability of future interaction and 
observed that this probability was an important determinant of cooperative behavior. This 
“shadow of the future” as coined by Axelrod (1984, p. 126) has not just been shown to foster 
cooperation in game settings, but also in organizational settings such as interactions between 
buyers and suppliers (Heide & Miner, 1992).   
Importantly, a crucial difference between having a future interaction perspective and not 
having a future interaction perspective lies in the interdependence structure of that relationship. 
When agents have a future interaction perspective, they are more dependent on the other party 
for their future pay-offs and may therefore be more committed to the relationship and value the 
relationship more than when future interactions are not expected (Kelley & Thibaut, 1975; 
Poppo, Zhou & Ryu, 2008). One result of this stronger commitment is that agents are more likely 
to initiate reconciliation in the event of transgressions (Tomlinson, 2011; Finkel et al., 2002). 
Perpetrators in relationships with a long future interaction perspective may therefore be more 
motivated to provide compensation to the victim as well.  
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Given that relationships with a future interaction perspective have much greater potential 
benefits to a perpetrator, we hypothesize that in relationships with a future interaction 
perspective, transgressors will be prepared to make an effort to reconcile even when the victim 
believes the transgression was committed intentionally. However, when there is no future 
interaction perspective with the victim, perpetrators will provide less compensation when the 
victim believes the transgression occurred intentionally, compared to when the victim believes 
the transgression occurred unintentionally. This would mean that after a victim accuses a 
transgressor of intentionally transgressing, the transgressors should be more willing to provide a 
financial compensation when they have a future perspective with the victim, compared to when 
they have no future perspective with the victim. 
3. The present research 
So far, research has provided evidence on when financial compensations can be effective. 
However, very little is known about the willingness of transgressors to provide these 
compensations. Following an instrumental perspective, we hypothesize that transgressors will be 
less willing to pay a financial compensation when a victim believes the violation occurred 
intentionally (as opposed to unintentionally), but only so when transgressor and victim have no 
future interaction perspective together. When a transgressor has a future interaction perspective 
with the victim, a transgressor will be willing to provide the same amount of compensation 
irrespective of whether the transgression is perceived to be intentional or unintentional.  
We tested these predictions in two studies, using a hypothetical transgression in an 
organizational setting in Study 1 and by means of a laboratory experiment using a modified trust 
game (Study 2) that allowed us to measure the willingness to compensate after an experimentally 
induced transgression. 
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4. Study 1 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants & design.  
Participants were recruited through the online recruitment system of Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
A total of 103 participants were recruited (49 women; M(age) = 35.89, SD(age) = 12.94). 
Participants were randomly assigned to our 2 (future interaction: future / no future) X 2 
(intentionality feedback: intentional / unintentional) between-subjects design. 
4.1.2 Materials.  
In the scenario, participants were asked to imagine they were the director of a company 
producing specialized parts for bicycles and motor bikes. Due to a computer system crash, their 
company had been unable to deliver a batch of bicycle parts to a customer (bicycle) company in 
a timely manner. Participants learned that due to this incident, the bicycle company had suffered 
an estimated financial loss of $ 50.000.  
We manipulated future concerns by adding in the no future condition the information that 
their company had recently decided to stop producing bicycle parts and focus on making and 
selling motorcycle parts only. Therefore, this would be the last delivery of parts to this company. 
In the future condition, the relationship with this company was described as an ongoing 
interaction. Intentionality feedback was manipulated by stating that in response to the late 
delivery, the owner of the bicycle company had contacted their firm communicating that he 
believed their company (un)intentionally did not meet the deadline. 
4.1.3 Measures.  
All measures, except for the amount of compensation, were measured on a 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much) Likert scale. We checked the effectiveness of our future interaction manipulation by 
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asking participants: (1) Our company will still have contracts with the bicycle company in the 
future (2) Our company will no longer deliver bicycle parts to the bicycle assembly company in 
the future and (reverse coded; r = .71; p < .001). We checked our intentionality feedback 
manipulation by asking participants: (1) The bicycle company accuses my company of 
intentionally breaking the delivery deadline; (2) The bicycle company understands that our 
company did not intend to break the delivery deadline (reverse coded; r = .87; p < .001). The 
amount of money that participants were willing to compensate was our main dependent variable. 
Using a slider, anchored from $ 0 to $ 100.000, participants could indicate the amount they 
wanted to offer to the customer company as compensation. 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Manipulation checks.  
An ANOVA with future interaction and intentionality feedback as independent variables and the 
future manipulation check scale as dependent variable indicated a significant effect of our future 
manipulation (F(1, 99) = 153.36, p < .001, η  = .61). There was no effect of our intentionality 
feedback manipulation (F(1, 99) = .07, p = .79, η  = .001), nor an interaction effect F(1, 99) = 
1.61, p = .21, η  = .02). As expected, participants in the future condition anticipated more future 
interaction with the customer company (M = 5.56, SD = 1.19) than participants in the no future 
conditions (M = 2.21, SD = 1.51). 
An ANOVA with future interaction and intentionality feedback as independent variables 
and the intentionality feedback manipulation check scale as dependent variable indicated a 
significant effect of intentionality feedback (F(1, 99) = 185.12, p < .001, η  = .65) as well as an 
effect of future (F(1, 99) = 9.54, p = .003, η  = .09). The interaction effect was not significant 
(F(1, 99) = .52, p = .48, η  = .005). As expected, participants in the intentional conditions 
  
WILLINGNESS TO COMPENSATE  14 
 
indicated they were accused of intentionally breaking the deadline (M = 5.52, SD = 1.45) while 
participants in the unintentional conditions indicated they were accused of unintentionally 
breaking the deadline (M = 1.88, SD = 1.28). Unexpectedly, participants in the no future 
conditions were also more inclined to think that the owner of the customer company thought they 
did not meet the deadline more intentional (M = 4.25, SD = 2.30) than participants in the future 
conditions (M = 3.07, SD = 2.11). 
4.2.2 Amount of compensation.  
An ANOVA with future and intentionality feedback as independent variables and the amount of 
compensation as dependent variable indicated a significant interaction effect (F(1, 99) = 4.43, p 
= .04, η2 = .04). There was no main effect of intentionality feedback (F(1, 99) = 1.01, p = .32, η  
= .01), nor of future interaction (F(1, 99) = 1.34, p = .25, η  = .01). 
Simple effects analyses (see Table 1 for cell means) indicated that in the no future 
interaction conditions participants were willing to offer more compensation when the owner of 
the customer company thought that not meeting the deadline was unintentional than when the 
owner of the customer company thought that not meeting the deadline was intentional, (F(1, 99) 
= 5.00, p = .03, η2 = .05). In the future interaction conditions there was no significant difference 
between intentional and unintentional (F(1, 99) = .58, p = .45, η  = .006). 
Moreover, when the owner of the customer company thought that not meeting the 
deadline was intentional, participants were more willing to compensate the owner when there 
was a future with that company compared to when there was no future (F(1, 99) = 5.24, p = .02, 
η

 = .05). When the owner of the customer company thought that not meeting the deadline was 
unintentional, the amount of compensation participants were willing to offer when there was a 
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future compared to when there was no future with that company did not significantly differ (F(1, 
99) = .45, p = .50, η  = .005). 
4.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 1 confirmed our predictions. Whereas participants were willing to 
pay significantly less compensation to a victim that believed the transgression happened 
intentionally as opposed to unintentionally, this was only  the case when victim and transgressor 
had no future interaction perspective together. In contrast, when both parties had a future 
interaction perspective, perpetrators wanted to compensate an equal amount when the victim 
thought the transgression happened intentionally or unintentionally. As such, the findings of 
Study 1 supported our hypothesis using a diverse sample and a typical transgression in 
organizational settings. 
  To strengthen the confidence in these initial findings, we decided to conduct a second 
study. In this second study, we aimed at addressing a number of issues concerning Study 1. One 
of the weaknesses of the scenario approach we employed there is that participants did not 
commit an actual transgression, but were merely asked to imagine they committed a 
transgression. Likewise, in deciding how much compensation they would offer to the victim, 
participants were not actually making decisions about their own outcomes. Finally, in Study 1 
the manipulation of future interaction perspective and intentionality feedback was not completely 
orthogonal as the future interaction manipulation also influenced perceptions of intentionality. 
Therefore, in Study 2, we wanted to verify whether we could replicate our findings with 
participants that (1) actually committed a transgression and (2) were making decisions that 
affected their own outcomes. For this purpose, we turned to the lab and conducted a controlled 
laboratory experiment. 
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5. Study 2 
5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Participant & design.  
A total of 197 participants (75 women; M(age) = 20.45, SD(age) = 1.80) were recruited at a major 
Dutch university. They were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of our 2 (future / no 
future) X 2 (intentional feedback / unintentional feedback) design. 
5.1.2 Procedure.  
In this study, we aimed to investigate financial compensation behavior for actual transgressions. 
In order to induce participants to commit a transgression we used a paradigm developed by 
Leunissen and colleagues (2012). This paradigm is a modification of the trust game (Berg, 
Dickhaut, & McCabe 1995), in which participants are coaxed into committing a transgression 
against their interaction partner.  
The game was presented as a task on social decision-making. Participants were told that 
they would be playing an interaction task with another person in the lab. By means of a fixed 
lottery, all participants were assigned to role of Player 2, while the other (non-existing) 
participant was Player 1. It was explained that Player 1 had received a valuable endowment 
consisting of an undisclosed number of valuable chips. Participants were told that any chips 
transferred to them by Player 1 would be tripled. Participants could then decide how many of the 
tripled number of chips to return to Player 1. 
The game was modified in such a way that participants were likely to make an unfair 
decision towards Player 1 (i.e., more likely to keep more chips for themselves than to give back 
to Player 1). This was done by inducing uncertainty over Player 1’s initial endowment. It was 
explained that the initial endowment of Player 1 could be anything from 10 to 30 chips; however, 
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the exact endowment was unknown to the participant. Subsequently, the participant learned that 
Player 1 has transferred 10 chips. Because 10 chips was the lowest endowment possible, we 
expected that most participants would infer that the original endowment of Player 1 would be 
larger than 10 chips (this assumption was confirmed, see the results section). Because 
participants estimated the original endowment of Player 1 to be larger than 10 chips, Player 1’s 
contribution of 10 chips implied that he/she had chosen not to transfer all his/her chips. We 
therefore expected that participants would also feel justified to return a smaller share than 50% 
of their 30 chips. 
 After participants had made their decision on how to divide the 30 chips, we revealed 
that the initial endowment of Player 1 had in fact been only 10 chips, meaning that Player 1 
showed a high level of trust by transferring the entire endowment. This meant that participants 
who made an advantageous unequal division (138 of the 197 participants) had violated the 
equality rule and acted unfairly towards Player 1. After we gave participants feedback about the 
final division of the chips, we asked a number of questions on their perceptions of the final 
division (see dependent measures section). After these questions, the experiment stopped for the 
participants who had not committed the transgression. Those participants who had committed a 
transgression proceeded towards the intentionality feedback manipulation and the subsequent 
dependent measures 
5.1.3 Manipulations.  
Expected future interaction was manipulated by informing participants in the no future 
condition that this game was a single shot interaction. Participants in that condition were told 
they would only play one round with their interaction partner. In the future condition, they were 
told that this was the first interaction of an indefinite number of interactions, without being 
  
WILLINGNESS TO COMPENSATE  18 
 
specific on how many interactions there would be in total. Because we manipulated whether or 
not more than one round of interaction was expected, and because we did not want to induce any 
suspicion whether this was true or not, we chose to not explicitly ask about this during the 
experiment and therefore did not include manipulation checks for the future interaction 
manipulation. After participants made the first division, they received feedback on Player 1’s 
thoughts about the initial division. This feedback consisted of a screenshot of two questions that 
Player 1 had answered. These two questions were: (1) “To what extent do you think Player 2 
made this distribution intentionally?”, and (2) “Do you think it is possible that Player 2 made this 
distribution by mistake?” Both questions were answered on a 1 (not at all), to 7 (very much so) 
scale. In the intentional feedback condition, Player 1 answered a 6 on the first question and a 2 
on the second question. In the unintentional feedback condition, Player 1 answered a 2 on the 
first question and a 6 on the second question. 
5.1.4 Measures.  
We checked our intentionality feedback manipulation with two items: (1) Player 1 thinks 
I intentionally created this division, and (2) Player 1 thinks I did not intend this distribution 
(recoded; r = .72, p < .001). After the transgression and the intentionality feedback manipulation, 
participants were given the opportunity provide a compensation to Player 1. Our dependent 
variable of interest was the final amount of chips that Player 1 received. 
5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Transgression.  
A total of 138 participants committed the transgression against Player 1 and 59 
participants did not. Because our future manipulation was induced before participants made a 
decision on how many chips to keep and how many to return to Player 1, we checked whether 
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our future manipulation had an effect on the transgression rates. A logistic regression analysis 
indicated that this was not the case (b = -.16, Wald’s χ2 = .26, p = .61, odds ratio: .85). 
In accordance with our expectations, participants overestimated the original endowment 
of chips of Player 1 (M = 19.9, SD = 6.41). Participants who committed the transgression thought 
the original endowment of Player 1 was significantly larger (M = 20.86, SD = 6.36) than 
participants who did not commit the transgression (M = 17.68, SD = 6.00; t(194) = 3.27, p = 
.001). As a result, participants who committed the transgression returned significantly less chips 
to Player 1 (M = 17.81, SD = 4.46) than participants who did not commit the transgression (M = 
7.31, SD = 3.76; t(195) = -16.98, p < .001). 
 A t-test on whether participants thought the final division was fair indicated that 
participants who had committed the transgression thought the final division was significantly less 
fair (M = 5.51, SD = 2.04) than those who did not commit a transgression (M = 3.05, SD = 1.71; 
t(195) = -8.71, p < .001). Moreover, participants who committed the transgression felt more 
guilty about the final division (M = 3.88, SD = 1.88) than participants who did not commit the 
transgression (M = 2.10, SD = 1.46; t(195) = 6.50, p < .001). 
5.2.2 Manipulation check.  
An ANOVA with the intentionality feedback manipulation and the future manipulation as 
independent variables and our intentionality feedback manipulation check scale as the dependent 
variable indicated a main effect of our intentionality feedback manipulation (F(1, 134) = 195.24, 
p < .001, η  = .59). As expected, participants in the intentional feedback condition indicated that 
Player 1 ascribed more intentionality to the division (M = 5.66, SD = 1.23) than participants did 
in the unintentional feedback condition (M = 2.75, SD = 1.19). Neither the main effect of future 
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interaction (F(1, 134) = .24, p = .62, η  = .002), nor the interaction effect (F(1, 134) = 1.24, p = 
.27, η  = .009) were significant. 
5.2.3 Compensation.  
An ANOVA with future and intentionality feedback as independent variable and the final 
amount of chips for Player 1 as the dependent variable indicated a significant interaction effect 
(F(1, 134) = 5.94, p  = .02, η  = .04; See Table 2 for cell means). Neither the main effect of 
intentionality feedback (F(1, 134) = .43, p= .51, η  = .003), nor the main effect of future was 
significant (F(1, 134) = .53, p = .47, η  = .004). 
Simple effects analyses indicated that when there was no future with Player 1, Player 1 
received a higher final amount of chips when Player thought the transgression was unintentional 
than when Player 1 thought it was intentional (F(1, 134) = 4.94, p  = .03, η  = .04). When 
participants expected a future interaction with Player 1, there was no significant difference 
between when Player 1 communicated that he/she thought the transgression was intentional and 
unintentional (F(1, 134) = 1.54, p = .22, ηη = .01). 
Moreover, when Player 1 thought the distribution was intentional, Player 1 received 
higher final outcomes when a future interaction was expected than when no future interaction 
were expected (F(1, 134) = 5.58, p  = .02, η  = .04). When Player 1 thought the distribution was 
unintentional, Player 1 received equal outcomes when there was a future compared to when there 
was no future (F(1, 134) = 1.33, p  = .25, η  = .01). 
5.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 2 confirmed our previous findings, but now in a laboratory setting 
where participants actually committed a transgression. As in Study 1, we observed that whereas 
participants were willing to pay significantly less compensation to a victim who believed the 
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transgression happened intentionally (as opposed to unintentionally), this was only the case when 
the victim and transgressor had no future interaction perspective together. In contrast, when both 
parties had a future interaction perspective, victims that believed the transgression happened 
intentionally were compensated just as much. In contrast to Study 1, this time we did not find an 
effect of our future interaction manipulation on ascribed intentionality, giving confidence that 
these variables were orthogonally manipulated.  
6. General discussion 
Financial compensations have proven to be a widely used and effective response to 
distributive harm (Desmet et al., 2011a, b).  Remarkably, we know little about the willingness of 
perpetrators to provide such a financial compensation and about the factors that influence this 
willingness to compensate. Across two studies, we have shown that both intentionality feedback 
by the victim and whether or not future interaction with the victim is to be expected influence 
this willingness. When a victim communicates that he or she perceives the violation as 
intentional, a transgressor will be inclined to pay less compensation than when the victim thinks 
it happened unintentional, but only so when transgressor and victim share no future interaction 
perspective. When they share a future interaction perspective, the difference between 
compensation after a victim communicated he/she thinks the transgressor transgressed 
intentionally and after a victim communicated he/she thinks the transgressor transgressed 
unintentionally did not differ significantly.  
These results support an instrumental perspective on the willingness of perpetrators to 
financially compensate a victim. This instrumental perspective departs from the idea that a 
perpetrator is willing to reconcile with a victim but predicts that the willingness to compensate is 
conditional on the costs and benefits that a perpetrator assigns to the reconciliation attempt. 
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Financial compensation comes at a cost but also at a benefit (i.e. a restored moral identity, 
standing in the community, and a restored relationship with the victim; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). 
Because the likelihood of forgiveness and reconciliation is higher when a victim believes the 
transgression occurred unintentionally compared to when the victim believes the transgression 
occurred intentionally, perpetrators are more willing to compensate a victim who communicated 
he/she though the transgression was committed unintentionally than we he/she communicated 
that he/she thought the transgression was committed intentionally. Indeed, reconciliation, even in 
the absence of a future relationship with the victim, still entail benefits to the perpetrator because 
the perpetrator is forgiven and their standing in the community is restored.  
When perpetrator and victim share a future interaction perspective, the potential benefits 
of a restored relationship become much larger (because the perpetrator can now obtain direct 
benefits from their relationship with the victim) and as a result a perpetrator is more willing to 
incur costs to restore the relationship. In support of this, perpetrators were significantly more 
willing to initiate reconciliation when a victim believed the transgression was committed 
intentionally when they had a future with the victim, compared to when they did not had a future 
with the victim. Taken together, our findings contribute to the literature in several ways. 
A first contribution of our findings to the study of financial compensation and trust repair 
is that we studied the transgressors’ willingness to provide them. Prior research in the area of 
trust repair has mainly evaluated the process of trust repair by focusing on the effects of this 
restoration strategy on victims. By showing that transgressors are both sensitive to victims’ 
reactions and relational characteristics in their decision to compensate, our studies join recent 
efforts that investigate when transgressors are actually willing to employ restoration strategies or 
not, which is an equally crucial stage in the process of trust repair (e.g. Leunissen et al., 2013).  
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A second contribution of our studies is that we focused on financial compensations that 
transgressors are willing to pay as an outcome variable. The few studies that did investigate the 
motivation of transgressors’ to engage in restorative actions only looked at transgressors’ 
willingness to apologize (e.g. Leunissen et al., 2012; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008).  Very little 
research on trust repair has investigated the factors that influence the amount of financial 
compensation that a transgressor is willing to pay. In the context of economic exchanges, 
interactions consist of the exchange of resources with a tangible value and transgressions 
therefore most often imply a material loss for the victim. Prior research has shown that in such 
cases, although apologies can be effective to some extent, supplementing these with a financial 
compensation for incurred losses is a more effective road towards trust repair (Bottom et al., 
2002; Haesevoets, Reinders Folmer, De Cremer, & Van Hiel, 2013). As a result, an equally 
important challenge for research on trust repair exists in uncovering the factors that underlie 
transgressors’ compensation behavior. By showing that transgressors’ willingness to pay is 
influenced by both victims’ reactions and relationship characteristics, our findings provide a 
valuable first step in this direction. 
Furthermore, although our findings show that transgressors can indeed be instrumental in 
their decision to compensate, an important observation is that when victims and transgressors 
would no longer interact, transgressors still pay a substantial amount of compensation to victims 
that communicated their belief about the transgressor’s good intent,. Our findings therefore also 
show that transgressors do not necessarily behave as utility-maximizing decision makers, which 
would predict that transgressors would not engage in compensation at all when there is no future 
interaction perspective with the victim (see Leunissen et al., 2012 for similar findings). 
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Our findings also open some interesting avenues for future research. First of all, more 
research is needed on the transgressor’s motives for providing financial compensation to victims. 
Although we embedded our research within the existing literature on trust repair, our findings do 
not allow concluding that the compensation behavior by transgressors is in fact driven by the 
desire to restore trust as we did not measure this trust repair motive. A desire to repair trust could 
be one of the motivators of perpetrators to provide financial compensation but there may also be 
other reasons why perpetrators may provide less compensation to victims that communicate their 
belief about bad intent. For one, perpetrators may also be less willing to compensate victims in 
basic act of reciprocity to an accusation of bad intent (i.e. reactance) which may be overruled by 
considerations of future interaction. Moreover, it would also be worthwhile to investigate to what 
extent victim feedback affects experienced guilt, which may in turn explain compensation 
behavior. Future research should therefore focus on providing more insight in the motives of 
transgressors’ compensation behavior by investigating underlying mechanisms. 
Second, given that our focus in these experiments was on the willingness to compensate 
only, one of the intriguing areas for further research lies in investigating when perpetrators are 
more willing to either offer compensation or verbal accounts (like denials, excuses or apologies) 
or provide both in combination. Findings have indicated that even in the case of distributive 
harm, providing apologies in combination with financial compensation can sometimes foster 
more reconciliation than the provision of compensation alone (Haesevoets et al., 2013; Okimoto 
& Tyler, 2007). Given that compensation and apologies are both costly but may entail different 
social costs, it may be interesting to unveil how the willingness of perpetrators to engage in 
either or both of these restoration strategies may differ along characteristics of the relationship 
with the victim, the violation or the transgressor.  
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Finally, by taking a transgressor’s perspective, our findings also open the possibility for 
researchers to study when reconciliation is likely to happen (or not) by running double-sided 
studies with subjects in both roles (victims and transgressors), while allowing mechanisms of 
communication and compensation between victims and transgressors (e.g. SimanTov-Nachlieli 
& Shnabel, 2013). These studies can provide an interesting starting point to investigate when a 
transgressors’ willingness to engage in restorative actions coincides or conflicts with victims’ 
actual need for these actions. Putting our findings that in short-term relations transgressors will 
be willing to pay less compensation when victims view the transgression as intentional side by 
side with previous findings that intentional violations can make financial compensation less 
effective (Desmet et al., 2011a), suggests therefore that in such situations reconciliation is 
unlikely to happen as both parties will be less inclined to show goodwill towards each other.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1. 
Means (SD) for compensation amount, and in Z scores, in Study 1 
 intentional unintentional 
Future 
30.696 (21.606) 
.24 (1.06) 
26.337 (18.390) 
.03 (.90) 
No future 
17.732 (17.890) 
-.39 (.88) 
30.094 (22.700) 
.21 (1.11) 
 
 
Table 2. 
Means (SD) for final amount of chips for the victim (Player 1) in Study 2 
 intentional unintentional 
Future 14.62 (4.91) 13.13 (4.76) 
No future 11.97 (5.93) 14.56 (3.28) 
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Highlights 
• We investigate perpetrators’ willingness to compensate in economic relations  
• We test how victims’ feedback influences the amount of compensation awarded 
• Whether feedback affects compensation size depends on the relation’s time horizon 
 
 
 
 
 
